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Abstract
We propose a simple misspeciﬁcation equilibrium concept and a behavioral learning
process explaining excess volatility in stock prices and high persistence in inﬂation.
Boundedly rational agents use a simple univariate linear forecasting rule and in
equilibrium correctly forecast the unconditional sample mean and ﬁrst-order sam-
ple autocorrelation. In the long run, agents thus learn the best univariate linear
forecasting rule, without fully recognizing the structure of the economy. In a ﬁrst
application, an asset pricing model with AR(1) dividends, a unique stochastic con-
sistent expectations equilibrium (SCEE) exists characterized by high persistence and
excess volatility, and it is globally stable under learning. In a second application,
the New Keynesian Phillips curve, multiple SCEE arise and a low and a high per-
sistence misspeciﬁcation equilibrium co-exist. Learning exhibits path dependence
and inﬂation may switch between low and high persistence regimes.
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11 Introduction
Expectation feedback plays a crucial role in economics and ﬁnance. Since the intro-
duction by Muth (1961), and its application in macroeconomics by Lucas (1972), the
Rational Expectation Hypothesis (REH) has become the predominant paradigm. A Ra-
tional Expectation Equilibrium (REE) is in fact a ﬁxed point of an expectation feedback
system. Typically it is assumed that rational agents perfectly know not only the correctly
speciﬁed market equilibrium equations, but also their parameter values conditional upon
all available information.
Despite its popularity, the REH has been criticized for its highly demanding and
unrealistic information requirements. Adaptive learning models have been proposed as
an alternative to rational expectations; see, e.g. Sargent (1993, 1999) and Evans and
Honkapohja (2001) for extensive surveys. In contrast to rational expectations, adaptive
learning models assume that agents do not have perfect knowledge about market equilib-
rium equations, but agents are assumed to have some belief, the perceived law of motion,
about the actual law of motion; the corresponding parameters are not known, but are
estimated by adaptive learning based on available observations. The implied actual law
of motion under adaptive learning is thus a time-varying self referential system, depending
on the perceived law of motion. Under this framework, a rational expectations equilibrium
is simply a situation in which the implied law of motion exactly coincides with the per-
ceived law of motion, and adaptive learning may converge to such a rational expectations
equilibrium. In other words, convergence of adaptive learning to a rational expectations
equilibrium can occur when the perceived law of motion is correctly speciﬁed.
In general a perceived law of motion will be misspeciﬁed. White (1994) argues that
an economic model or a probability model is only a more or less crude approximation to
whatever might be the ”true” relationships among the observed data and consequently it
is necessary to view economic and/or probability models as misspeciﬁed to some greater
or lesser degree. Sargent (1991) ﬁrst develops a notion of equilibrium as a ﬁxed point
of an operator that maps the perceived law of motion (a vector ARMA process) into a
statistically optimal estimator of the actual law of motion. This may be viewed as an
early example of a Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium (RPE), as deﬁned by Evans and
Honkapohja (2001), formalizing the idea that agents have misspeciﬁed beliefs, but within
the context of their forecasting model they are unable to detect their misspeciﬁcation.
Branch (2006) gives an excellent survey and argues that the RPE is a natural alternative
2to rational expectation equilibrium because it is to some extent consistent with Muth’s
original hypothesis of REE while allowing for bounded rationality by restricting the class
of the perceived law of motion.
The main contribution of our paper is to develop a behavioral equilibrium concept,
where agents try to learn a simple but misspeciﬁed forecasting rule. Our equilibrium
concept - Stochastic Consistent Expectations Equilibrium (SCEE) - may be viewed as
the simplest RPE and therefore it seems more likely that agents might coordinate their
expectations and learn such a simple behavioral equilibrium. The actual law of motion
(ALM) of the economy is a two (or higher) dimensional linear stochastic system. Agents
are forecasting one variable - say the price - of the economy using a simple univariate AR(1)
forecasting rule. In a SCEE the mean and the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of realized prices
in the economy coincide with the corresponding mean and ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of
agents’ AR(1) perceived law of motion (PLM). In addition, a simple adaptive learning
scheme - Sample Autocorrelation Leaning (SAC-learning) - with an intuitive behavioral
interpretation, enforces convergence to the (stable) SCEE.
We illustrate our behavioral equilibrium concept in two standard applications. In the
ﬁrst - an asset pricing model with an exogenous stochastic dividend process - the SCEE
is unique and the SAC-learning scheme always converges to the SCEE. The SCEE is
characterized by excess volatility with asset prices much more volatile (with the variance
in asset prices more than doubled) than under REE. In the second application - a New
Keynesian Philips curve (NKPC) - with an exogenous AR(1) process for the output gap
and an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) stochastic shock to inﬂation -
multiple stable SCEE may co-exist. In particular, for empirically plausible parameter
values a SCEE with highly persistent inﬂation exists, matching the stylized facts of US-
inﬂation data.
Related literature
Our behavioral equilibrium is closely related to the Consistent Expectations Equilib-
rium (CEE) introduced by Hommes and Sorger (1998), where agents believe that prices
follow a linear AR(1) stochastic process, whereas the implied actual law of motion is a
deterministic chaotic nonlinear process. Along a CEE, price realizations have the same
sample mean and sample autocorrelation coeﬃcients as the AR(1) perceived law of mo-
tion. A CEE is another early example of a RPE and may be seen as an ”approximate
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the best linear approximation within the class of perceived laws of motion of the actual
(unknown) nonlinear law of motion. Hommes and Rosser (2001) investigate CEE in an
optimal ﬁshery management model and used numerical simulations to study adaptive
learning of CEE in the presence of dynamic noise. The adaptive learning scheme used
here is SAC-learning, where the parameters of the AR(1) forecasting rule are updated
based on the observed sample average and ﬁrst-order sample autocorrelation. S¨ ogner and
Mitl¨ ohner (2002) apply the CEE concept to a standard asset pricing model with inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) dividends and showed that the unique CEE
coincides with the REE. As we will see in the current paper, introducing autocorrelations
in the stochastic dividend process will lead to learning equilibrium diﬀerent from REE.
Tuinstra (2003) analyzes ﬁrst-order consistent expectations equilibria numerically in a
deterministic overlapping generations (OLG) model. Hommes et al (2004) generalize the
notion of CEE to nonlinear stochastic dynamic economic models, introducing the concept
of stochastic consistent expectations equilibrium (SCEE). In a SCEE, agents’ perceptions
about endogenous variables are consistent with the actual realizations of these variables
in the sense that the unconditional mean and autocorrelations of the unknown nonlinear
stochastic process, which describes the actual behavior of the economy, coincide with the
unconditional mean and autocorrelations of the AR(1) process agents believe in. They
applied this concept to an OLG model and studied the existence of SCEE and its relation-
ship to sample autocorrelation learning (SAC-learning) based on numerical simulations.
Showing theoretically existence of SCEE and its relationship to adaptive learning has
proven to be technically diﬃcult, while convergence of SAC-learning has been studied only
by numerical simulations. The principle technical diﬃculty here is to calculate autocor-
relation coeﬃcients, prove existence of ﬁxed points in a nonlinear system and analyze the
relationship between SCEE and sample autocorrelation learning. Branch and McGough
(2005) obtain existence results on ﬁrst-order SCEE theoretically and analyze the stabil-
ity of SCEE under real-time learning numerically in a stochastic non-linear self-referential
model where expectations are based on an AR(1) process. Lansing (2009) considers a spe-
cial class of SCEE in the New Keynesian Philips curve, where the value of the Kalman
gain parameter in agents’ forecast rule is pinned down using the observed autocorrelation
of inﬂation changes. Lansing (2010) studies a Lucas-type asset pricing model and found
numerically a near-rational restricted perceptions equilibrium, for which the covariance of
an underparameterized (one parameter) PLM coincides with the covariance of an approx-
4imate ALM. Bullard et al. (2008, 2010) add judgment into agents’ forecasts and use the
concept of SCEE to provide a related interesting concept of exuberance equilibria. They
study the resulting dynamics in the New Keynesian model and a standard asset pricing
model, respectively, where the driving variables are white noises (no autocorrelations).
The current paper studies the existence of SCEE and its stability under SAC-learning
in two standard applications: an asset pricing model and the New Keynesian Philips
curve. In both applications the driving variables (dividends or real marginal costs) are
assumed to follow AR(1) processes. More speciﬁcally, while the perceived law of motion
agents believe in is an AR(1) process with white noise, the true process of economy is not
an AR(1) process but a linear stochastic process driven by an exogenous autocorrelated
process. In addition to the conceptual contribution of introducing a behavioral learning
equilibrium, our paper makes two methodological contributions. First, we prove existence
of SCEE under general conditions in a misspeciﬁed framework, where prices (inﬂation)
have the same mean as REE. Second, we present the ﬁrst proof that the SAC-learning
converges to stable SCEE and provide simple and intuitive stability conditions. SCEE
thus represents a ﬁxed point of learning dynamics under misspeciﬁcation. Moreover,
we provide interesting results in our two applications. In the asset pricing model, we
show that the SCEE is unique and (globally) stable and characterized by market prices
ﬂuctuating around fundamental prices and exhibiting stronger serial autocorrelations and
higher volatility than the REE for plausible parameters. In the New Keynesian Philips
curve, we show that multiple SCEE may exist. In particular, for a large set of plausible
parameters a SCEE exists with highly persistent inﬂation. Coordination on a behavioral
learning equilibrium may thus explain high persistence in inﬂation (Milani, 2007).
Some other related literature, for example Timmermann (1993, 1996), Bullard and
Duﬀy (2001), Guidolin and Timmermann (2007) and Bullard et al. (2010), shows the
eﬀects of learning on asset returns from diﬀerent perspectives. Timmermann (1993, 1996)
shows that learning helps to explain excess volatility and predictability of stock returns
in the similar present value asset pricing model. In Timmermann (1993, 1996), the per-
ceived law of motion is correctly speciﬁed but the related parameters are estimated by
adaptive learning, and in the long run learning converges to REE. Bullard and Duﬀy
(2001) introduce adaptive learning into a general-equilibrium life-cycle economy with
capital accumulation and show that in contrast to perfect-foresight dynamics, the sys-
tem under least-squares learning possesses equilibria that are characterized by persistent
excess volatility in returns to capital. Guidolin and Timmermann (2007) characterize
5equilibrium asset prices under adaptive, rational and Bayesian learning schemes in a
model where dividends evolve on a binomial lattice and ﬁnd that learning introduces se-
rial correlation and volatility clustering in stock returns. Bullard et al. (2010) construct
a simple asset pricing example with constant known dividends and i.i.d. asset supply
and ﬁnd that exuberance equilibria, when they exist, can be extremely volatile relative
to fundamental equilibria. An important conceptual diﬀerence with these references is
our behavioral interpretation of the SCEE as the simplest example of RPE. A behavioral
SCEE together with an intuitive SAC-learning scheme may explain agents’ coordination
on (almost) self-fulﬁlling equilibria.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the main concepts, i.e. ﬁrst-
order SCEE and sample autocorrelation learning in a general framework. Section 3 studies
existence and stability under SAC-learning theoretically as well as numerically in a stan-
dard asset pricing model. Section 4 presents a second application, the New Keynesian
Philips curve, and shows existence of multiple SCEE and the relationship to SAC-learning
theoretically and numerically. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminary concepts
This section brieﬂy introduces the main concepts. Suppose that the law of motion of
an economic system is given by the stochastic diﬀerence equation
xt = f(x
e
t+1, yt, ut), (2.1)
where xt is the state of the system (e.g. asset price or inﬂation) at date t and xe
t+1 is the
expected value of x at date t + 1. This denotation highlights that expectations may not
be rational. Here f is a continuous function, {ut} is an i.i.d. noise process with mean zero
and ﬁnite absolute moments1, where the variance is denoted by σ2
u, and yt is a driving
variable (e.g. dividends or the output gap), assumed to follow an exogenous stochastic
AR(1) process
yt = a + ρyt−1 + εt, 0 ≤ ρ < 1, (2.2)
where {εt} is another i.i.d. noise process with mean zero and ﬁnite absolute moments,
with variance σ2
ε, and uncorrelated with {ut}. The mean of the stationary process yt is
1The condition on ﬁnite absolute moments is required to obtain convergence results under SAC-
learning.
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1−ρ2 and the kth-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient of yt is
ρk, see for example, Hamilton (1994).
Agents are boundedly rational and do not know the exact form of the actual law
of motion in (2.1). We assume that, in order to forecast xt+1, agents only use past
observations xt−1,xt−2,··· , etc. Hence agents do not recognize that xt is driven by an
exogenous stochastic process yt. Instead agents believe that the economic variable xt
follows a simple linear stochastic process. More speciﬁcally, agents’ perceived law of
motion (PLM) is an AR(1) process, as in Hommes et al. (2004) and Branch and McGough
(2005), i.e.
xt = α + β(xt−1 − α) + δt, (2.3)
where α and β are real numbers with β ∈ (−1,1) and {δt} is a white noise process; α is the
unconditional mean of xt while β is the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient. Given the
perceived law of motion (2.3), the 2-period ahead forecasting rule for xt+1 that minimizes
the mean-squared forecasting error is
x
e
t+1 = α + β
2(xt−1 − α). (2.4)
Combining the expectations (2.4) and the law of motion of the economy (2.1), we obtain
the implied actual law of motion (ALM)
xt = f(α + β
2(xt−1 − α), yt, ut), (2.5)
with yt an AR(1) process as in (2.2).
Stochastic consistent expectations equilibrium
We are now ready to recall the deﬁnition of stochastic consistent expectations equi-
librium (SCEE). Following Hommes et al. (2004)2, the concept of ﬁrst-order SCEE is
deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A triple (µ,α,β), where µ is a probability measure and α and β are
real numbers with β ∈ (−1,1), is called a ﬁrst-order stochastic consistent expectations
equilibrium (SCEE) if the three conditions are satisﬁed:
S1 The probability measure µ is a nondegenerate invariant measure for the stochastic
diﬀerence equation (2.5);
2In Hommes et al. (2004), the actual law of motion is xt = f(xe
t+1, ut), without the driving variable
yt. However, the deﬁnitions of SCEE and SAC-learning can still be applied here.
7S2 The stationary stochastic process deﬁned by (2.5) with the invariant measure µ has
unconditional mean α, that is, Eµ(x) =
 
x dµ(x) = α;
S3 The stationary stochastic process deﬁned by (2.5) with the invariant measure µ has
unconditional ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient β.
That is to say, a ﬁrst-order SCEE is characterized by the fact that both the uncondi-
tional mean and the unconditional ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient generated by the
actual (unknown) stochastic process (2.5) coincide with the corresponding statistics for
the perceived linear AR(1) process (2.3). This means that in a ﬁrst-order SCEE agents
correctly perceive the mean and the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation (persistence) of economic
variables although they do not correctly specify their model of the economy.
Our SCEE concept may be viewed as the simplest example of a RPE. It should be
stressed that the SCEE has an intuitive behavioral interpretation. In a SCEE agents use
a linear forecasting rule with two parameters, the mean α and the ﬁrst-order autocorre-
lation β. Both can be observed from past observations by inferring the average price (or
inﬂation level) and the (ﬁrst-order) persistence of the time series. For example, β = 0.5
means that, on average, prices mean revert toward their long-run mean by 50 percent.
These observations could be made approximately and simply by observing the time series
of aggregate variables. It is interesting to note that in learning-to-forecast laboratory
experiments with human subjects, for many subjects forecasting behavior can indeed be
described by simple rules, such as a simple AR(1) rule, see for example, Hommes et al.
(2005), Adam (2007), Heemeijer et al. (2005), Hommes (2011).
Finally, we note that in a ﬁrst-order SCEE, the orthogonality condition imposed by
Restricted Perceptions Equilibrium (RPE)
Ext−1[xt − α − β(xt−1 − α)] = E(xt−1 − α)[xt − α − β(xt−1 − α)] = 0
is satisﬁed. The orthogonality condition shows that agents can not detect the correlation
between their forecasting errors and the agent’s perceived model, see Branch (2006). The
ﬁrst-order SCEE is a RPE where agents have their model incorrect; but within the context
of their forecasting model agents are unable to detect their misspeciﬁcation.
Sample autocorrelation learning
In the above deﬁnition of ﬁrst-order SCEE, agents’ beliefs are described by the linear
forecasting rule (2.4) with ﬁxed parameters α and β. However, the parameters α and
8β are usually unknown. In the adaptive learning literature, it is common to assume
that agents behave like econometricians using time series observations to estimate the
parameters as additional observations become available. Following Hommes and Sorger
(1998), we assume that agents use sample autocorrelation learning (SAC-learning) to
learn the parameters α and β. That is, for any ﬁnite set of observations {x0,x1,··· ,xt},







and the ﬁrst-order sample autocorrelation coeﬃcient is given by
βt =
 t−1
i=0(xi − αt)(xi+1 − αt)
 t
i=0(xi − αt)2 . (2.7)
Hence αt and βt are updated over time as new information arrives.
Adaptive learning is sometimes referred to as statistical learning, because agents act as
statisticians or econometricians and use a statistical procedure such as OLS to estimate
and update parameters over time. SAC-learning may be viewed as another statistical
learning procedure. We would like to stress however that SAC-learning has a simple
behavioral interpretation that agents simply infer the sample average and persistence (i.e.
ﬁrst-order autocorrelation) from time series observations. We focus on the entire sample
average for αt in (2.6) and sample ﬁrst-order autocorrelation for βt in (2.7) over the entire
time-horizon, but one could also restrict the learning to the last T observations with
T relatively small (e.g., T = 100 or even smaller). It is an easy and natural way for
agents, especially those without professional training, to estimate mean and ﬁrst-order









then the SAC-learning is equivalent to the following recursive dynamical system (see
Appendix A).
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9The actual law of motion under SAC-learning is therefore given by
xt = f(αt−1 + β
2
t−1(xt−1 − αt−1), yt, ut), (2.9)
with αt,βt as in (2.8) and yt as in (2.2).
In Hommes and Sorger (1998), the map f in (2.9) is a nonlinear deterministic function
depending only on αt−1 +β2
t−1(xt−1 −αt−1), without the driving variable yt and the noise
ut. Hommes et al. (2004) extend the CEE framework to SCEE, with f a nonlinear
stochastic process (but without exogenous driving variable yt). In this paper the map f
is a linear function, depending on not only αt−1 + β2
t−1(xt−1 − αt−1) and ut but also on
an exogenous AR(1) process yt. Hence, the true law of motion of the economy is a two
dimensional linear stochastic process, while agents try to forecast using a univariate linear
model. In the following we give two typical examples in economies and study existence
of ﬁrst-order SCEE and its relationship to SAC-learning in detail.
3 An asset pricing model with AR(1) dividends
A simple example of the general framework (2.1) is given by the standard present value
asset pricing model with stochastic dividends; see for example Brock and Hommes (1998).
Here we consider AR(1) dividends instead of independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) dividends.
Assume that agents can invest in a risk free asset or in a risky asset. The risk-free
asset is perfectly elastically supplied at a gross return R > 1. pt denotes the price (ex
dividend) of the risky asset and yt denotes the (random) dividend process. Let   Et,   Vt
denote the subjective beliefs of a representative agent about the conditional expectation
and conditional variance of excess return pt+1 + yt+1 − Ryt. By the assumption that the
agent is a myopic mean-variance maximizer of tomorrow’s wealth, the demand zt for the
risky asset by the representative agent is then given by
zt =
  Et(pt+1 + yt+1 − Rpt)
  a  Vt(pt+1 + yt+1 − Rpt)
=
  Et(pt+1 + yt+1 − Rpt)
  aσ2 ,
where   a > 0 denotes the risk aversion coeﬃcient and the belief about the conditional
variance of the excess return is assumed to be constant over time3, i.e.   Vt(pt+1 + yt+1 −
Rpt) ≡ σ2.
3This assumption is consistent with the assumption that agents believe that prices follow an AR(1)
process and dividends follow a stochastic AR(1) process with ﬁnite variance.
10Equilibrium of demand and supply implies
  Et(pt+1 + yt+1 − Rpt)
  aσ2 = zs,
where zs denotes the supply of outside shares in the market, assumed to be constant over
time. Without loss of generality4, we assume zero supply of outside shares, i.e. zs = 0.













t+1 is the conditional expectation of next period’s price pt+1 and ye
t+1 is the con-
ditional expectation of next period’s dividend yt+1.
Dividend {yt} is assumed to follow an AR(1) process (2.2). Suppose that the risky
asset (share) is traded, after payment of real dividends yt, at a competitively determined
price pt, so that yt is known by agents, and
y
e
t+1 = a + ρyt. (3.2)








t+1 + a + ρyt
 
, (3.3)
where dividend yt follows the AR(1) process (2.2). Compared with our general framework
(2.1), here the map f is a simple linear function and the noise ut ≡ 0.
3.1 Rational expectations equilibrium with AR(1) dividends
Under the assumption that agents are rational, a straightforward computation (see


















Thus based on (3.4), the unconditional mean and the unconditional variance of the
rational expectation price p∗


















(R − ρ)2(1 − ρ2)
. (3.6)
4In the case zs > 0, the diﬀerence with the analysis below only lies in the mean of the SCEE α∗ =
¯ y−  aσ
2zs
R−1 . The analysis on autocorrelations and variances remains the same.
11Furthermore, the ﬁrst-order autocovariance and autocorrelation coeﬃcient of the rational
expectation price p∗





t−1 − p∗) =
ρ3σ2
ε






t−1) = ρ. (3.7)
3.2 Existence of ﬁrst-order SCEE
We now relax the rational expectation assumption and assume that agents are bound-
edly rational and believe that the price pt follows a univariate AR(1) process
pt = α + β(pt−1 − α) + δt. (3.8)
Given the perceived law of motion and knowledge of all prices observed up to period t−1,




t+1 = α + β
2(pt−1 − α). (3.9)









2(pt−1 − α) + a + ρyt
 
,
yt = a + ρyt−1 + εt.
(3.10)




R < 1 and 0 ≤ ρ < 1, the price process (3.10) is stationary and ergodic.
Denote the unconditional expectation of pt by ¯ p. Then ¯ p satisﬁes
R¯ p = α(1 − β
2) + β
2¯ p + a + ρ¯ y = α(1 − β
2) + β
2¯ p + ¯ y.
Hence
¯ p =
α(1 − β2) + ¯ y
R − β2 . (3.11)






Hence using (3.5), we conclude that in a SCEE the unconditional mean of market
prices coincides with the REE fundamental prices. That is to say, in a SCEE market
prices ﬂuctuate around the fundamental prices.
12Next consider the second consistency requirement of a SCEE on the ﬁrst-order auto-
correlation coeﬃcient β of the PLM. A straightforward computation (see Appendix C)





Deﬁne G(β) := F(β) − β. In the case that ρ > 05, since G(0) = ρ > 0 and G(1) =
1+Rρ




ρ+R < 0, there exists at least one β∗ ∈ (0,1), such that




Furthermore, because F(0) = ρ and F ′(β) =
2βR(1−ρ2)
(ρβ2+R)2 > 0 for β ∈ (0,1), we have
F(β) > ρ for β ∈ (0,1). Hence
β
∗ > ρ.
It can be shown (see Appendix D) that β∗ is unique. We thus have the following propo-
sition on ﬁrst-order stochastic consistent expectations equilibrium.
Proposition 1 In the case that 0 < ρ < 1, there exists a unique nonzero ﬁrst-order
stochastic consistent expectations equilibrium (α∗,β∗) for the asset pricing model with
AR(1) dividends (3.10), which satisﬁes α∗ =
¯ y
(R−1) = p∗ and β∗ > ρ.
This proposition states that in a SCEE self-fulﬁlling market prices have the same mean as
the fundamental prices, but a higher ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient than the funda-
mental prices. In other words, in a SCEE market prices ﬂuctuate around the fundamental
prices but with a higher persistence than under REE.
3.2.1 Numerical analysis
Now we illustrate the above results numerically. For example, consider R = 1.05,ρ =
0.9,a = 0.005,εt ∼ i.i.d. U(−0.01,0.01) (i.e. uniform distribution on [−0.01,0.01])6.
Figures 1a 7 and 1b illustrate the existence of a unique stable ﬁrst-order SCEE, where
(α∗,β∗) = (1,0.997). The time series of fundamental prices and market prices with
5In the case that ρ = 0, F(β) =
β
2






Since β ≤ 1 < R, the only equilibrium is β = 0. Therefore, in the case that ρ = 0, there is no nonzero
ﬁrst-order stochastic consistent expectations equilibrium (SCEE).
6As shown theoretically above, the numerical results are independent of selection of the parameter
values within plausible ranges, sample paths, initial values and distribution of noise.
7In Figure 1a, we take β = 0.9. However in fact, α∗ is independent of β, as can be seen from (3.12).
13(α,β) = (α∗,β∗) are shown in Figure 1c, which illustrates that the market price ﬂuctuates
around the fundamental price but has more persistence and exhibits excess volatility. In
fact, based on Proposition 1, in a SCEE the mean of the market prices is equal to that
of the fundamental prices and the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient β∗ of the market
prices is greater than that of the fundamental prices ρ, implying that the market prices
have higher persistence. In order to further illustrate this, the autocorrelation functions
of the market prices and the fundamental prices are shown in Figure 1d. It can be seen
from Figure 1d that autocorrelation coeﬃcients of the market prices are higher than those
of the fundamental prices and hence the market prices have higher persistence.
We now investigate how the ﬁrst-order SCEE and excess volatility of market prices
depend on the autoregressive coeﬃcient of dividends ρ, which is also the ﬁrst-order au-
tocorrelation of fundamental prices. Consistent with Proposition 1, Figure 2a illustrates
that the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of market prices is higher than that of fundamental
prices, especially much higher as ρ > 0.4. In fact, based on empirical ﬁndings, e.g. Tim-
mermann (1996), the autoregressive coeﬃcient of dividends ρ is about 0.9, where the
corresponding β∗ ≈ 0.997. In the case ρ > 0.4, correspondingly the variance of market
prices is larger than that of fundamental prices, as illustrated in Figure 2b. In the Figure
2b, the ratio of variance of market prices and variance of fundamental prices is greater




p∗ ≈ 2.5. Given the variance of fundamental prices






(β2ρ + R)(R − ρ)2
(R2 − β4)(R − ρβ2)
 




Proposition 1 demonstrates ρ < β∗(ρ) < 1 for 0 < ρ < 1, and hence β∗(ρ) converges to 1




p∗ converges to 1, consistent with Figure 2b. So
for plausible parameter values of ρ, the variance of market prices is greater than that of
fundamental prices, indicating that market prices have excess volatility in the SCEE.
3.3 Stability under SAC-learning
In this subsection we study the stability of SCEE under SAC-learning in the asset
pricing model with AR(1) dividends. The asset pricing model with AR(1) dividends










t−1(pt−1 − αt−1) + a + ρyt
 
,
yt = a + ρyt−1 + εt,
(3.14)














(a) SCEE for α∗









(b) SCEE for β∗


















(c) Time series of prices in SCEE

















(d) Autocorrelation function in SCEE
Figure 1: (a) SCEE α∗ is the intersection point of the mean ¯ p =
α(1−β2)+¯ y
R−β2 (bold curve)
with the perceived mean α (dotted line); (b) SCEE β∗ is the intersection point of the
ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient F(β) =
β2+Rρ
ρβ2+R (bold curve) with the perceived ﬁrst-
order autocorrelation β (dotted line); (c) 1,000 observations of fundamental prices (dotted
curve) and market prices (bold curve) in the SCEE; (d) autocorrelation functions of 10,000
fundamental prices (lower dots) and market prices (higher stars) in the SCEE. Parameter
values are R = 1.05,ρ = 0.9,a = 0.005,εt ∼ i.i.d. U(−0.01,0.01).















(a) 1-order autocorrelation in SCEE













(b) Ratio of variances in SCEE
Figure 2: (a) SCEE β∗ with respect to ρ; (b) ratio of variance of market prices and
variance of fundamental prices with respect to ρ, where R = 1.05.
with αt,βt as in (2.8). This is an expectations feedback system. Realized prices inﬂuence
the perceptions agents have about economic reality and these perceptions feed back into
the actual dynamics of the economy and determine future prices that will be realized.
In order to study the dynamical behavior of the model (3.14), we ﬁrst check the
stability of the unique SCEE (α∗,β∗) in Proposition 1. The stability of the SCEE is in
fact determined by the coeﬃcient
1−β2
R−β2 in front of α in the unconditional mean in (3.11)
and by F(β) in (3.13). On one hand, since 0 ≤
1−β2
R−β2 < 1, it can be seen from (3.11) that
α∗ is stable. On the other hand, the proof of uniqueness of β∗ in Appendix D shows that
0 < F ′(β∗) < 1, and that therefore β∗ is stable. We thus have stability of the unique
SCEE under SAC-learning.
Proposition 2 The unique SCEE (α∗,β∗) in Proposition 1 is stable under SAC-learning,
that is, the SAC-learning process (αt,βt) converges to the unique SCEE (α∗,β∗) as time
t tends to ∞.
Proof. See Appendix E.
This proposition shows that the SCEE describes the long-run behavior of SAC-learning
when agents use a simple AR(1) forecasting rule.
3.3.1 Numerical analysis
Figure 3 shows that SAC-learning (αt,βt) converges to the unique stable SCEE (α∗,β∗).
Figure 3a indicates that the mean of the market prices under SAC-learning αt tends to














































Figure 3: (a) Time series αt → α∗(1.0) under SAC-learning; (b) time series βt → β∗(0.997)
under SAC-learning; (c) time series of market prices under SAC-learning and fundamental
prices. Initial values p0 = 0.3,y0 = 0.08.
the mean α∗ = 1 in the SCEE, while Figure 3b shows that the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation
coeﬃcient of the market prices under SAC-learning βt tends to the ﬁrst-order autocor-
relation coeﬃcient β∗ = 0.997 in the SCEE. Therefore, given the same sample path of
noise, the time series of the market prices under SAC-learning is almost the same as
that in the SCEE, which can be seen by comparing Figure 3c to Figure 1c. That is,
the market prices under SAC-learning ﬂuctuate around the fundamental prices but have
excess volatility and stronger autocorrelation. Therefore, the self-referential SCEE and
learning oﬀer a possible explanation of bubbles within a stationary time series framework,
as suggested in Bullard et al. (2010).
4 The New Keynesian Philips curve with AR(1) driv-
ing variable
Now consider a second application of SCEE and learning in macroeconomics, the New
Keynesian Philips curve with an AR(1) driving variable as suggested by Lansing (2009).






t+1 + γyt + ut,
yt = a + ρyt−1 + εt,
(4.1)
where πt is the inﬂation at time t, πe
t+1 is expected inﬂation at date t + 1 and yt is the
output gap or real marginal cost. λ ∈ [0,1) is the representative agent’s subjective time
discount factor, γ > 0 is related to the degree of price stickiness in the economy and
17ρ ∈ [0,1) describes the linear dependence of the output gap on its past value. ut and
εt are i.i.d. stochastic disturbances with zero mean and ﬁnite absolute moments with
variances σ2
u and σ2
ε, respectively. The key diﬀerence with the standard asset pricing
model is that this model includes two stochastic disturbances, not only the noise εt of
the AR(1) driving variable, but also an additional noise ut in the New Keynesian Philips
curve. We refer to ut as a markup shock that is often motivated by the presence of a
variable tax rate and to εt as a demand shock that is uncorrelated with the markup shock.
4.1 Rational expectations equilibrium










yt + ut. (4.2)



























t−1 − π∗) =
γ2ρσ2
ε














Note that in the special case σ2
u = 0, the above expression reduces to Corr(π∗
t,π∗
t−1) = ρ
as in Eq. (3.7). Moreover, the larger the noise level σ2
u in the markup shock, the smaller
the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation in the fundamental rational equilibrium inﬂation.
4.2 Existence of ﬁrst-order SCEE
Suppose now that agents are boundedly rational and that their perceived law of motion
for inﬂation is a univariate AR(1) process.
πt = α + β(πt−1 − α) + vt (4.5)




πt = λ[α + β
2(πt−1 − α)] + γyt + ut,
yt = a + ρyt−1 + εt.
(4.6)
Denote the unconditional expectation of πt by ¯ π and the unconditional expectation of
yt by ¯ y. Then ¯ y = a/(1 − ρ) and ¯ π satisﬁes
¯ π = λα(1 − β
2) + λβ
2¯ π + γ¯ y.
Hence
¯ π =
λα(1 − β2) + γ¯ y
1 − λβ2 . (4.7)
Imposing the ﬁrst consistency requirement on the mean, i.e. ¯ π =
λα(1−β2)+γ¯ y






(1 − λ)(1 − ρ)
=: α
∗.
Therefore using (4.3), in a SCEE the unconditional mean of inﬂation coincides with the
REE fundamental inﬂation.
After straightforward computations (see Appendix G), we obtain
Corr(πt,πt−1) =











Note that if we replace λ by 1
R, γ by
ρ
R and σu by 0, then the autocorrelation in (4.8) is
simpliﬁed to
β2+Rρ
ρβ2+R, which coincides with the autocorrelation in the asset pricing model
in (3.13).
The second consistency requirement of ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient β yields,
F(β) = β.
Deﬁne G(β) := F(β) − β. Since 0 < ρ < 1 and 0 ≤ λ < 1,
G(0) =
γ2ρ































19Therefore, there exists at least one β∗ ∈ (0,1), such that G(β∗) = 0, i.e. F(β∗) = β∗. In
the special case without autocorrelation in the driving variable yt, i.e. ρ = 0, equation
(4.8) gives F(β) = λβ2. Hence the ﬁrst-order SCEE for ρ = 0 is β∗ = 0 and coincides
with the REE.
Proposition 3 In the case that 0 < ρ < 1 and 0 ≤ λ < 1, there exists at least one
nonzero ﬁrst-order stochastic consistent expectations equilibrium (SCEE) (α∗,β∗) for the
New Keynesian Philips curve (4.6) with α∗ =
γa
(1−λ)(1−ρ) = π∗.
It turns out that in the NKPC multiple SCEE may co-exist. To see this, rewrite the













u increases, then F(β) increases, and therefore multiple SCEE may occur. The
simulations in the following subsection illustrate this point more clearly.
4.2.1 Numerical analysis





Based on empirical ﬁndings, such as Lansing (2009), Gali et al. (2001) and Fuhrer (2006,
2009), we ﬁrst examine a plausible case8 in which γ = 0.075,σu = 0.003162,σε = 0.01,ρ =
0.9,λ = 0.99,εt ∼ N(0,σ2
ε),ut ∼ N(0,σ2




ε = 0.1. Figure 4a
illustrates existence of a unique (stable) α∗, where α∗ = 0.03. Figure 4b shows that
there exist three β∗, where β∗ = 0.3066,0.7417,0.9961. That is, there exist three ﬁrst-
order SCEE: two stable ones (α∗,β∗) = (0.03,0.3066),(0.03,0.9961) and an unstable
one (α∗,β∗) = (0.03,0.7417). Considering that the SAC-learning converges to a stable
SCEE (see the next subsection), the stable (learnable) SCEE are the most interesting.
Figures 4c and 4d illustrate the two time series for the two (stable) SCEE (α∗,β∗) =
(0.03,0.3066),(0.03,0.9961), suggesting that inﬂation has diﬀerent persistence at diﬀerent
SCEE. That is, the SCEE is an important factor in aﬀecting inﬂation persistence. In
fact, the time series of inﬂation in the SCEE with high β∗ in Figure 4d has similar
persistence characteristics and amplitude of ﬂuctuation as in empirical inﬂation data in
8As shown in Lansing (2009), based on regressions using either the output gap or labor’s share of
income over the period 1949.Q1 to 2004.Q4, ρ = 0.9,σε = 0.01. Estimates of the NKPC parameters
λ,γ,σu are sensitive to the choice of the driving variable, the sample period, and the econometric model
etc. Later we also examine the eﬀects of some other parameters on SCEE. Furthermore, based on the
above theoretical results, a just aﬀects the mean of inﬂation ¯ π but not the autocorrelation coeﬃcient
F(β). For σu and σε, F(β) only depends on their ratio σu/σε but not on their absolute values.
20Tallman (2003). Furthermore, Figure 4d illustrates that inﬂation in the SCEE with high
β∗ has stronger persistence than the REE inﬂation, where the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation
coeﬃcient of REE inﬂation is 0.865 less than β∗ = 0.9961.
In order to further study the eﬀects of ρ, Figure 5 illustrates SCEE β∗ together
with the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient of REE inﬂation as functions of ρ. For
0.84 < ρ < 0.918, two stable SCEE β∗ exist separated by an unstable SCEE. The large
SCEE β∗ is larger than the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient of REE inﬂation, while
the small SCEE β∗ is smaller than the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient of REE in-
ﬂation. In the next subsection we will show that for a large range of initial values of
inﬂation the SAC-learning converges to the stable high SCEE β∗ with strong persistence.
If ρ > 0.918, there exists only one stable SCEE β∗ with stronger persistence than REE.
Therefore for plausible values of ρ around 0.9, inﬂation in a SCEE often generates high-
persistence as shown in Figure 4d. This result is consistent with the empirical ﬁnding
in Adam (2007) that the Restricted Receptions Equilibrium (RPE) describes subjects’
inﬂation expectations surprisingly well and provides a better explanation for the observed
persistence of inﬂation than REE.
Figure 6 illustrates how the number of SCEE depends on γ. The simulations show that
for plausible γ there exist at least one and at most three SCEE β∗. For suﬃciently small
γ(< 0.05), there exists only one low β∗, as shown in Figure 6a. As γ increases, the graph








goes up. At γ = 0.05, a new SCEE β∗ ≈ 0.975
is created at a tangent bifurcation, see Figure 6b. Immediately after that there exist three
β∗, two stable equilibria and one unstable. That is, at γ = 0.05, a tangent bifurcation
occurs. Figures 6c and 6d illustrate the three β∗ with the high stable β∗ close to 1. As
γ increases, the two stable β∗-values grow. At γ = 0.084, another tangent bifurcation
occurs, where the lower β∗-values coincide, as shown in Figure 6e. For γ > 0.084, there is
only one large β∗, see Figure 6f, which corresponds to high-persistence SCEE of inﬂation.
Hence a larger γ tends to lead to higher persistence of inﬂation. Intuitively with a larger
γ, it can be seen from (4.1) that the driving variable (output gap or real marginal cost)
has a larger impact on inﬂation. Hence when the driving variable is relatively important,
a high-persistence SCEE occurs. If on the other hand, σ2
u increases, that is, the noise




u decreases and the strong reverses and low-persistence
SCEE become more likely. That is, intuitively clear, as more noise to inﬂation dominates
the driving variable, this leads to a low-persistence inﬂation equilibrium.














(a) SCEE for α∗














(b) SCEE for β∗













(c) time series at (α∗,β∗) = (0.03,0.3066)

















(d) time series at (α∗,β∗) = (0.03,0.9961)
Figure 4: (a) SCEE α∗ is the unique intersection point of the mean of inﬂation ¯ π =
λα(1−β2)+γ¯ y
1−λβ2 (bold curve) with the perceived mean α (dotted line); (b) SCEE β∗ is an











(bold curve) and the perceived ﬁrst-order autocorrelation β (dotted line); (c) time series
of inﬂation in stable low-persistence SCEE (α∗,β∗) = (0.03,0.3066); (d) times series of
inﬂation in stable high-persistence SCEE (α∗,β∗) = (0.03,0.9961) (bold curve) and time
series of REE inﬂation (dotted curve), where γ = 0.075,σu = 0.003162,σε = 0.01,ρ =
0.9,λ = 0.99,εt ∼ N(0,σ2
ε),ut ∼ N(0,σ2
u),a = 0.0004.















Figure 5: First-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient of REE inﬂation (dotted real curve),
stable SCEE β∗ with respect to ρ (bold curves), unstable SCEE β∗ (dotted curve), where
γ = 0.075,σu = 0.003162,σε = 0.01,λ = 0.99.
4.3 Stability under SAC-learning
The SAC-learning dynamics in the New Keynesian Philips curve with AR(1) driving




πt = λ[αt−1 + β
2
t−1(πt−1 − αt−1)] + γyt + ut,
yt = a + ρyt−1 + εt.
(4.9)
with αt,βt as in (2.8). This is another expectations feedback system with expectation
feedback from inﬂation forecasting. Realized inﬂations inﬂuence the beliefs agents have
about economic reality and these beliefs feed back into the actual dynamics of economy
and determine the future realized inﬂations together with an exogenous driving variable
output gap or real marginal costs.
We further check the relationship between stability of SCEE (α∗,β∗) and SAC-learning.
For α∗, since 0 ≤
λ(1−β2)
1−λβ2 < 1, it can be seen from (4.7) that α∗ is stable. For β∗, because
of the complexity of the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation F(β) in (4.8), it is diﬃcult to check
the stability of SCEE, or even the number of SCEE. We have the following relationship
between the SCEE and the SAC-learning.
Proposition 4 If (0 ≤)F
′
(β∗) < 1, then the SCEE (α∗,β∗) is stable, that is, the SAC-
learning (αt,βt) converges to the SCEE (α∗,β∗) as time t tends to ∞.
The proof is given in Appendix H. If the stable SCEE is not unique, the convergence de-
pends on initial states of the system, as illustrated in the following numerical simulations.














(a) γ = 0.01














(b) γ = 0.05














(c) γ = 0.065














(d) γ = 0.075














(e) γ = 0.084














(f) γ = 0.1
Figure 6: SCEE β∗ with γ = 0.01 (a); γ = 0.05 (b); γ = 0.065 (c); γ = 0.075 (d);




ε = 0.1,ρ = 0.9,λ = 0.99.
244.3.1 Numerical analysis
For (π0,y0) = (0.028,0.01), Figures 7a and 7b show that the SAC-learning dynamics
(αt,βt) converges to the stable low-persistence SCEE (α∗,β∗) = (0.03,0.3066). Figure
7a illustrates that the mean of inﬂation αt tends to the mean α∗ = 0.03. Figure 7b
illustrates that the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient of inﬂation βt slowly tends to
the low-persistence stable ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient β∗ = 0.3066. For the
diﬀerent initial value (π0,y0) = (0.1,0.15), our numerical simulation shows that the mean
of inﬂation αt under SAC-learning still tends to the mean α∗, but slowly9 (see Figure
7c), while Figure 7d indicates that the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient of inﬂation
βt under SAC-learning tends to the higher stable ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient
β∗ = 0.996110. Correspondingly given the same sample path of noise, the time series of
inﬂation under SAC-learning can also replicate the time series of inﬂation in the SCEE
after long-term learning as shown in the preceding asset pricing model.
Numerous simulations show that as initial values of inﬂation are (relatively) higher
than the mean α∗ = 0.03, the sample autocorrelation learning βt generally enters the
high-persistence region. In particular, a large shock to the inﬂation may easily cause a
jump of the SAC-learning process into the high-persistence region.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced a very simple type of misspeciﬁcation equilibrium
and a plausible corresponding behavioral learning process. Boundedly rational agents use
a univariate linear forecasting rule and in equilibrium correctly forecast the unconditional
sample mean and ﬁrst-order sample autocorrelation. Hence, to a ﬁrst order approxima-
tion the simple linear forecasting rule is consistent with observed market realizations.
Sample autocorrelation learning simply means that agents are slowly updating the two
coeﬃcients –sample mean and ﬁrst-order autocorrelation– of their linear rule. In the long
run, agents thus learn the best univariate linear forecasting rule, without fully recognizing
the structure of the economy.
We have applied our SCEE and SAC-learning concepts to a standard asset pricing
9The slow convergence is caused by the slope
λ−λβ
2
1−λβ2 in the expression (4.7), which is very close to 1
for λ = 0.99, as shown in Figure 4a.
10As shown in Figure 4b, F
′
(β∗) is close to 1 and hence the convergence of SAC-learning is very slow.









(a) αt → 0.03







(b) βt → 0.3066












(c) αt → 0.03









(d) βt → 0.9961
Figure 7: Time series of αt and βt under SAC-learning with diﬀerent initial values
(π0,y0) = (0.028,0.01)(a), (b) and (π0,y0) = (0.1,0.15) (c), (d).
26model with AR(1) dividends and a New Keynesian Philips curve driven by an AR(1)
process for the output gap or marginal costs. In both applications, the law of motion
of the economy is linear, but it is driven by an exogenous stochastic AR(1) process.
Agents however are not fully aware of the exact linear structure of the economy, but
use a simple univariate forecasting rule, to predict asset prices or inﬂation. In the asset
pricing model a unique SCEE exists and it is globally stable under SAC-learning. An
important feature of the SCEE is that it is characterized by high-persistence and excess
volatility in asset prices, signiﬁcantly higher than under rational expectations. In the New
Keynesian model, multiple SCEE arise and a low and a high-persistence misspeciﬁcation
equilibrium co-exist. The SAC-learning exhibits path dependence and it depends on the
initial states whether the system converges to the low-persistence or the high-persistence
inﬂation regime. In particular, when there are shocks– e.g. oil shocks– temporarily causing
high inﬂation, SAC-learning may lock into the high-persistence inﬂation regime.
Are these simple misspeciﬁcation equilibria empirically relevant or would smart agents
recognize their (second order) mistakes and learn to be perfectly rational? This empirical
question should be addressed in more detail in future work, but we provide some argu-
ments for the empirical relevance of our equilibrium concept. Firstly, in our applications
the SCEE already explain some important stylized facts: (i) high persistence and excess
volatility in asset prices, (ii) high persistence in inﬂation and (iii) regime switching in
inﬂation dynamics, which could explain a long phase of high US inﬂation in the 1970s
and early 1980s as well as a long phase of low inﬂation in the 1990s and 2000s. Secondly,
we stress the behavioral interpretation of our misspeciﬁcation equilibrium and learning
process. The univariate AR(1) rule and the SAC-learning process are examples of simple
forecasting heuristics that can be used without any knowledge of statistical techniques,
simply by observing a time series and roughly ”guestimating” its sample average and
its ﬁrst-order persistence coeﬃcient. Coordination on a behavioral forecasting heuristic
that performs reasonably well to a ﬁrst-order approximation seems more likely than co-
ordination on more complicated learning or sunspot equilibria. Even though some smart
individual agents might be able to improve upon the best linear, univariate forecasting
rule, a majority of agents might still stick to their simple univariate rule. It therefore
seems relevant to describe aggregate phenomena by simple misspeciﬁcation equilibria and
behavioral learning processes. In fact, there is already some experimental evidence for
the relevance of misspeciﬁcation equilibria in Adam (2007). More recently Assenza et al.
(2011) and Pfajfar and Zakelj (2010) ran learning to forecasting experiments with human
27subjects in a New Keynesian framework with expectations feedback from individual in-
ﬂation and output gap forecasts. Simple linear univariate models explain a substantial
part of individual inﬂation and output gap forecasting behavior.
In future work we plan to consider more general economic settings and study SCEE
and their relationship to SAC-learning. An obvious next step is to apply our SCEE and
SAC-learning framework to higher dimensional linear economic systems, with agents fore-
casting by univariate linear rules. In particular, the fully speciﬁed New Keynesian model
of inﬂation and output dynamics would be an interesting (two-dimensional) application.
Finally, it is interesting and challenging to study SCEE and misspeciﬁcation under het-
erogeneous expectations and allow for switching between diﬀerent rules. Branch (2004)
and Hommes (2011) provide some empirical and experimental evidence on heterogeneous
expectations, while Berardi (2007) and Branch and Evans (2006, 2007) have made some
related studies on heterogeneous expectations and learning in similar settings.
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28Appendix
A Recursive dynamics of SAC-learning














zt := (x0 − αt)(x1 − αt) + ··· + (xt−1 − αt)(xt − αt)
= (x0 − αt−1 −
1
t + 1
(xt − αt−1))(x1 − αt−1 −
1
t + 1
(xt − αt−1)) +
··· + (xt−1 − αt−1 −
1
t + 1








(2αt−1 − x0 − x1 + ··· + 2αt−1 − xt−2 − xt−1) +
t − 1





(xt−1 − αt−1)(xt − αt−1) −
t





(xt − αt−1)[2(t − 1)αt−1 − x0 − 2x1 − ··· − 2xt−2 − xt−1 + t(xt−1 − αt−1)]
−
1





(xt − αt−1)[x0 + (t + 1)xt−1 − (t + 2)αt−1] −
1
(t + 1)2(xt − αt−1)
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= zt−1 + (xt − αt−1)Φ4,
where Φ4 = xt−1 +
x0
t+1 − t2+3t+1
(t+1)2 αt−1 − 1
(t+1)2xt.
Write
nt := (x0 − αt)
2 + (x1 − αt)
2 + ··· + (xt − αt)
2









= (x0 − αt−1)
2 + (x1 − αt−1)
2 + ··· + (xt−1 − αt−1)
2 +
t + t2







29All these results are consistent with those in Appendix 1 of Hommes, Sorger & Wagener
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30B Rational expectations equilibrium of prices
Under the assumption that the transversality condition lim
k→∞
Et(pt+k)
Rk = 0 holds, the



























































a + ρa + ρ2yt
R2 + ··· +






a + ρa + ρ2yt












































C First-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient of price
We rewrite (3.10) as
pt − ¯ p =
β2
R






εt−1 + ··· . (C.1)
Thus
E[(pt − ¯ p)(pt−1 − ¯ p)] = E
 β2
R




εt(pt−1 − ¯ p) +
ρ2
R





E(pt−1 − ¯ p)
2 + 0 +
ρ2
R
E[εt−1(pt−1 − ¯ p)] + ··· . (C.2)





(pt−1 − ¯ p)(pt − ¯ p) +
ρ
R
εt(pt − ¯ p) +
ρ2
R





E[(pt−1 − ¯ p)(pt − ¯ p)] +
ρ
R
E[εt(pt − ¯ p)] +
ρ2
R
E[εt−1(pt − ¯ p)] + ··· . (C.3)
31Thus based on (C.2) and (C.3),










E[εt(pt − ¯ p)] +
ρ3
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E[εt(pt − ¯ p)] +
ρ2
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E[εt(pt − ¯ p)] + ρE[εt−1(pt − ¯ p)] + ···
 
. (C.4)
In the following we will calculate E(εt−kpt),k = 0,1,2,··· .
E[εt(pt − ¯ p)] =
β2
R















E[εt−1(pt − ¯ p)] =
β2
R
































E[εt−2(pt − ¯ p)] =
β2
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E[εt−k(pt − ¯ p)] =
β2
R


















































































































(1 − ρ2)(R − ρβ2)
. (C.5)
Substituting (C.5) into (C.4), we obtain










R2 − β4 ·
ρσ2
ε




(R2 − β4)(1 − ρ2)(R − ρβ2)
. (C.6)
Furthermore, based on (C.2),
































D Proof of uniqueness of β∗ (Proposition 1)




(ρβ2 + R)2 −
8ρβ2R(1 − ρ2)
(ρβ2 + R)3 =
2R(1 − ρ2)(R − 3ρβ2)
(ρβ2 + R)3 .
Therefore, if ρ ≤
R
3, then R − 3β2ρ ≥ R − β2R > 0. Thus G′′(β) = F ′′(β) > 0.
Note that G(0) > 0, G′(0) = −1 < 0 and G(1) < 0, G′(1) =
2R(1−ρ2)
(ρ+R)2 − 1. Hence if
33G′(1) ≤ 0, then G′(β∗) < 0. If G′(1) > 0, then there exists a minimal point β1 such that
G′(β1) = 0. Moreover, since G(1) < 0, then G(β1) < 0 (otherwise, G(1) ≥ G(β1) ≥ 0,
which is contradictory to G(1) < 0). Hence β∗(∈ (0,β1)) is unique and G′(β∗) < 0, hence
0 < F ′(β∗) < 1.
















































−(R − 1)(R + 9)
8R
< 0.
That is, G(β) is monotone. Therefore, in the case that 0 < ρ < 1, β∗ is unique and
G′(β∗) < 0, hence 0 < F ′(β∗) < 1.
E Proof of Proposition 2










t−1(pt−1 − αt−1) + a + ρyt
 
,
yt = a + ρyt−1 + εt.
(E.1)
Set γt = (1 + t)−1. Since all functions are smooth, the learning rule (2.8) satisﬁes the
conditions (A.1-A.3) of Section 6.2.1 in Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.124).
In order to check the conditions (B.1-B.2) of Section 6.2.1 in Evans and Honkapohja
(2001, p.125), we rewrite the system in matrix form by
Xt = A(θt−1)Xt−1 + B(θt−1)Wt,
34where θ′
t = (αt,βt,Rt),X′

















0 1 0 0





























As shown in Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.186), A(θ) and B(θ) satisfy the Lipschitz
conditions and B is bounded. Since εt is assumed to have bounded moments, condition
(B.1) is satisﬁed. Furthermore, the eigenvalues of matrix A(θ) are 0 (double), ρ and
β2
R .
According to the assumption |β| ≤ 1 and 0 < ρ < 1, all eigenvalues of A(θ) are less than
1 in absolute value. Then it follows that there is a compact neighborhood including the
SCEE solution (α∗,β∗) on which the condition that |A(θ)| is bounded strictly below 1 is
satisﬁed.
Thus the technical conditions for Section 6.2.1 of Chapter 6 in Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) are satisﬁed. Moreover, since pt is stationary under the condition |β| ≤ 1 and









E(pt − α)(pt−1 − α)
exist and are ﬁnite. Hence according to Section 6.2.1 of Chapter 6 in Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2001, p.126), the associated ODE is

     
     
dα
dτ


















α(1 − β2) + ¯ y
R − β2 − α =
−rα + ¯ y
R − β2 ,
dβ
dτ













0 F ′(β∗) − 1

.
Based on the analysis in Appendix D, F ′(β∗) − 1 < 0. Therefore, the unique stable
SCEE (α∗,β∗) corresponds to the unique stable ﬁxed point of the ODE (E.2). Thus the
SAC learning (αt,βt) converges to the unique stable SCEE (α∗,β∗) as time t tends to ∞.
F Rational expectations equilibrium inﬂation
Under the assumption that the transversality condition limk→∞ λkEt(π∗
t+k) = 0 holds,





t+1 + γyt + ut
= λEt[λEt+1π
∗

































yt + ut. (F.1)
G First-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient of inﬂation




πt − ¯ π = λβ
2(πt−1 − ¯ π) + γ(yt − ¯ y) + ut,






πt − ¯ π = λβ
2(πt−1 − ¯ π) + γρ(yt−1 − ¯ y) + γεt + ut,
yt − ¯ y = ρ(yt−1 − ¯ y) + εt.
(G.2)




2(πt−1 − ¯ π)
2 + γρ(πt−1 − ¯ π)(yt−1 − ¯ y) + γ(πt−1 − ¯ π)εt + (πt−1 − ¯ π)ut
 
= λβ
2V ar(πt) + γρE[(πt−1 − ¯ π)(yt−1 − ¯ y)] + γE[(πt−1 − ¯ π)εt] + (πt−1 − ¯ π)ut
= λβ
2V ar(πt) + γρE[(πt−1 − ¯ π)(yt−1 − ¯ y)]
= λβ
2V ar(πt) + γρE[(πt − ¯ π)(yt − ¯ y)]. (G.3)
V ar(πt)





2(πt − ¯ π)(πt−1 − ¯ π) + γρ(πt − ¯ π)(yt−1 − ¯ y) + γ(πt − ¯ π)εt + (πt − ¯ π)ut
 
= λβ
2E[(πt − ¯ π)(πt−1 − ¯ π)] + γρE[(πt − ¯ π)(yt−1 − ¯ y)] + γ(πt − ¯ π)εt + (πt − ¯ π)ut]
= λβ






where the last equation is based on the fact that E[(πt − ¯ π)εt] = E
 
λβ2(πt−1 − ¯ π)εt +




ε and E[(πt − ¯ π)ut] = E
 
λβ2(πt−1 − ¯ π)ut + γρ(yt−1 −





Based on (G.3) and (G.4),
V ar(πt) = λβ










2V ar(πt) + γρE[(πt − ¯ π)(yt − ¯ y)]
 








4V ar(πt) + λβ








λβ2γρE[(πt − ¯ π)(yt − ¯ y)] + γρE[(πt − ¯ π)(yt−1 − ¯ y)] + γ2σ2
ε + σ2
u
1 − λ2β4 . (G.5)
Thus, in order to obtain E[(πt − ¯ π)(πt−1 − ¯ π)] and V ar(πt), we need calculate E[(πt −
¯ π)(yt − ¯ y)] and E[(πt − ¯ π)(yt−1 − ¯ y)].
E[(πt − ¯ π)(yt − ¯ π)] = E
 
λβ
2(πt−1 − ¯ π)(yt − ¯ y) + γρ(yt−1 − ¯ π)(yt − ¯ y) + γεt(yt − ¯ π) + ut(yt − ¯ π)
 
= λβ
2E{(πt−1 − ¯ π)[ρ(yt−1 − ¯ y) + εt]} + γρE[(yt−1 − ¯ π)(yt − ¯ y)]
+γE{εt[ρ(yt−1 − ¯ y) + εt]} + E[ut(yt − ¯ π)]
= λβ








E[(πt − ¯ π)(yt − ¯ π)] =
γσ2
ε
(1 − ρ2)(1 − λβ2ρ)
. (G.6)
Hence based on (G.6),




2(πt−1 − ¯ π)(yt−1 − ¯ y) + γρ(yt−1 − ¯ π)
2 + γεt(yt−1 − ¯ π) + ut(yt−1 − ¯ π)
 
= λβ
2E[(πt−1 − ¯ π)(yt−1 − ¯ y)] + γρE(yt−1 − ¯ π)















































































λβ2(2 − ρ2) + ρ
 












  γ2(λβ2ρ + 1)









E[(πt − ¯ π)(πt−1 − ¯ π)] = λβ





(1 − ρ2)(1 − λβ2ρ)
. (G.9)
Thus, the correlation coeﬃcient Corr(πt,πt−1) satisﬁes





































38H Proof of Proposition 4
In order to check the conditions (B.1-B.2) of Section 6.2.1 in Evans and Honkapohja
(2001, p.125), we rewrite the system in matrix form by
Xt = A(θt−1)Xt−1 + B(θt−1)Wt,
where θ′
t = (αt,βt,Rt),X′









0 0 0 0
λα(1 − β2) + γa λβ2 0 γρ
0 1 0 0


























As shown in Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.186), A(θ) and B(θ) clearly satisfy the
Lipschitz conditions and B is bounded. Since ut and εt are assumed to have bounded
moments, condition (B.1) is satisﬁed. Furthermore, the eigenvalues of matrix A(θ) are 0
(double), ρ and λβ2. According to the assumption |β| ≤ 1, 0 ≤ λ < 1 and 0 < ρ < 1,
all eigenvalues of A(θ) are less than 1 in absolute value. Then it follows that there is a
compact neighborhood including the SCEE solution (α∗,β∗) on which the condition that
|A(θ)| is bounded strictly below 1 is satisﬁed.
Thus the technical conditions for Section 6.2.1 of Chapter 6 in Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) are satisﬁed. Moreover, since πt is stationary under the condition |β| ≤ 1, 0 ≤ λ <









E(πt − α)(πt−1 − α)
exist and are ﬁnite. Hence according to Section 6.2.1 of Chapter 6 in Evans and Honkapo-
hja (2001, p.126), the associated ODE is

     
     
dα
dτ














    




λα(1 − β2) + γ¯ y
1 − λβ2 − α =
α(λ − 1) + γ¯ y
1 − λβ2 ,
dβ
dτ
= F(β) − β =












Hence a SCEE corresponds to a ﬁxed point of the ODE (H.1). Furthermore, the SAC
learning (αt,βt) converges to the stable SCEE (α∗,β∗) as time t tends to ∞.
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